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Abstract  
Foreign intervention in civil war is generally perceived as being peace generating. 
While interveners may seek ¨stability¨, the result of intervention is all too frequently 
prolonged violence and political chaos. While previous studies have confirmed a 
causal relationship between foreign intervention and the prolonged duration of civil 
war, they have neglected to dig into the causal mechanisms that explain how such 
intervention extents civil war. In the light of an increasing occurrence of the civil war 
phenomenon coupled with foreign intervention, it is essential to acquire a complete 
understanding of the relation between foreign intervention and civil war so that policy 
makers can create more effective responses and develop the right strategies. This 
study contributes to this by examining the role of US intervention in the Peruvian and 
Colombian civil conflict. A careful consideration of these two cases reveals that a 
foreign actors that supports a government in civil war, introduces separate interests to 
the conflict. Subsequently, diverging strategies undermine the government´s ability to 
deal with the insurgent independently. Foreign intervention may temporarily oppress 
an insurgent, but by addressing primarily the symptoms and not the cause of the 
conflict, foreign intervention leads to a prolonged civil war duration in the long-run.  
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1. Introduction 
Scholars in international relations have become increasingly conscious of the 
international dimension of civil war.  The involvement of foreign actors in civil 
conflict has led to the blurring of the boundaries between intrastate and interstate 
wars. There are many examples both during and after the Cold War that confirm this 
development. For example, the US was involved in the civil war in Angola (1972-
1980s), Nicaragua (1980´s), Afghanistan (1979-1992), Peru (1980-2000), Congo 
(1996-1997) and Liberia (1999-2003) while France was involved in Algeria (1991-
2002) and Rwanda (1990-1993). As a result, the literature on the internationalization 
of civil wars and the role of foreign intervention has grown significantly in recent 
years. Foreign intervention is most commonly perceived as being peace-generating 
(Regan, 2000; Walter, 1997; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006).  A neutral intervention 
helps to reduce asymmetries in a conflict and to transform and settle it equitably. 
Foreign actors may help the adversaries to communicate with each other and 
contribute to making the settlement more credible and fair. Additionally, they can 
monitor compliance to agreements and sanction violators (Kriesberg, 2013). 
However, a biased intervention in favour of one party can contribute to ending the 
conflict as well. Through direct or indirect financial, economic or military support, 
states can intervene in distant civil conflict by making one party excessively stronger 
and help ensure a victory (Salehyan, 2006). 
 
If this were to be the case, then all civil wars could be solved by foreign intervention. 
Yet, many civil wars have lasted for a long time despite foreign intervention. 
Consider the civil war in Colombia (from 1964 onwards) and Peru (from 1980 
onwards), and more recently in Afghanistan (from 2001 onwards). Despite durable 
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and intense US intervention, civil violence caused predominantly by insurgents 
continues to persist. Rather then shortening the duration of the conflict, US 
intervention seems to have complicated and prolonged these civil disputes.  
 
Evidently, theory of intervention does not always comply with real world examples. 
This provides an opening for the exploration of the following research question: How 
can foreign support to a government in civil war prolong the duration of the conflict? 
This study will answer this question with regard to two in-depth case studies that 
consider US involvement in the Peruvian and Colombian civil war. By doing so this 
study makes a social and theoretical contribution in the following way.  
 
Civil war, defined as those internal conflicts that count more than 1000 deaths per 
year, has become a familiar phenomenon since the start of the Cold War. Since 1960, 
twenty per cent of all nations have experienced at least ten years of civil war 
(Blatmann and Miguel, 2010: 4). Given the fact that civil wars rarely remain within 
the boundaries of a single state, many more nations have been directly or indirectly 
affected. Being aware that foreign intervention can extend the duration of a civil 
dispute, is not enough. What is necessary is a full understanding of how foreign 
intervention prolongs the duration of civil war. A more complete comprehension of 
the relation between foreign intervention and civil war duration will help 
policymakers to design more successful and more efficient responses to them and 
contribute to unravelling the complexities of conflict resolution.  
 
This research makes a theoretical contribution in two ways. First of all, as opposed to 
previous studies I will focus explicitly on foreign support to a government in civil 
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war. Secondly, against most conventional studies of civil war I will apply a qualitative 
research method to test my hypotheses. With my choice of topic and methodology I 
intend to make an original contribution to the field of foreign intervention and civil 
war, which has become an increasingly socially and politically relevant topic in the 
past decades.  
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2. Literature Review 
The increased salience of civil conflict during and after the Cold War has given rise to 
a large body of literature on the causes and origins of civil wars. Most of this 
literature explores the causes of civil conflict within the boundaries of the state and 
therefore limits itself to trying to explain the interaction between two parties: the 
government and the insurgents. Literature on civil war often focuses exclusively on 
domestic determinants such political instability (Hegre et al., 2001), regime type, 
income (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) and an abundance of natural resources (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004). Other scholars have focussed on the characteristics, capabilities and 
underlying motives of the insurgents (Salehyan, 2006). Such country-specific research 
however, does not match the empirical phenomenon of many contemporary civil 
wars. In fact, many contemporary conflicts such as the war in Afghanistan, Somalia 
and Colombia involve more than two actors. Many conflicts have what Cunningham 
calls an ¨international dimension¨, meaning that besides a government and insurgent, 
an external actor is involved (Cunningham, 2006).  
 
2.1 From interstate to intrastate war 
How does an external actor get involved in a civil conflict? During civil war, the 
boundaries between inter-state and intra-state conflict often diffuse. Governments 
engaged in civil war may undertake cross-border counterinsurgency actions against 
rebels that have slipped across borders, a phenomenon Gleditsch (2006) calls 
¨externalization¨. Next to this, negative spill-over effects such as stray fire and mass 
refugee migration can induce international conflict and even military intervention. 
Refugee flows pose particular challenges to neighbouring states since they can be an 
economic burden and a cause of political instability (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006; 
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Gurr, 1993). However, a foreign actor becomes truly intertwined and actively 
involved in civil conflict through intervention, which is defined as a third party that 
brings in his own separate set of preferences into the conflict and is able to actively 
pursue them (Cunningham, 2006).  
 
2.2 Intervention 
There is general agreement among scholars that intervention is a form of conflict 
management and thus intends to reduce rather than exacerbate the conflict at hand. 
Many scholars claim that the involvement of a third party is a necessary guarantee for 
peace (Regan, 2000; Walter, 1997; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006). Doyle and 
Sambanis and Fortna conclude that interventions are effective because peacekeepers 
change the economic incentives or the armed group away from warfare, monitor 
compliance with the peace agreement and facilitate communication on both sides 
(Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2004). However, neutral interventions rarely 
occur. Rather, interventions are aimed at trying to avoid or change outcomes that 
would have occurred in the absence of intervention. The greatest deal of literature 
focuses on foreign support for rebel groups. Extensive research has been conducted 
on what motivates states to support insurgencies and which types of organizations 
receive and accept foreign support (Salehyan, 2010; Salehyan, Gleditsch and 
Cunningham, 2010). The perceived effect on the duration of the conflict is disputed 
about. Gleditsch suggests that support for rebel groups increases their capabilities and 
tilts the balance of power in their favour, leading to a decisive victory and the end of 
civil war (Gleditsch, 2007). Regan (2002) however makes a contradicting point 
saying that rebel support increases the rebel’s expectations and blurs their 
perceptions. They may be strong enough to fight but not strong enough to force the 
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government to concessions, leading to what he calls a ¨hurting stalemate¨. In this way, 
foreign support to rebels prolongs rather than shortens a civil war.  
 
A substantial less amount of attention has been given to foreign support for 
governments in civil war. This is remarkable given the emerging occurrence of this 
phenomenon since the beginning of the Cold War. Of the 138 intrastate conflicts of 
the post Second World War period, 62% involved some form of military or economic 
intervention by a third party (Regan, 1996: 344). The literature suggests that 
intervening foreign actors pursue their own range of goals. Work as early as Deutsch 
discusses the phenomenon of ¨proxy wars¨ (Deutsch, 1964). Stavenhagen claims that 
regional powers may in fact have expansionist or geopolitical goals, which draw them 
into civil conflicts in order to consolidate their hegemony and enable them access to 
valued resources (Stavenhagen, 1996).  
 
Scholars adopt different standpoints as to what are the principle reasons for 
supporting a government in civil war. Constructivist views like those of Gleditsch say 
that these motives are shaped to a large extent by a state´s affinity and antipathies to 
other regimes (Gleditsch, 2007). In my view however, intervention is a rational 
decision that is the result of a cost-benefit analysis and driven by a degree of self-
interest. Economic interests seem to be a key factor. International trade flourishes 
under conditions of political stability and the prospect of political instability can 
induce states to take action. According to Bonfatti (2010), a key trading partner may 
be interested in keeping an incumbent in power because he can be controlled more 
easily from the exterior than his challenger, even if this means keeping in place a non-
democratic regime. Bonfatti (2010) shows how American support for autocratic 
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regimes like Guatemala (1954), Chile (1972) led to a long period of civil violence. He 
concludes that foreign investment provides a strong incentive for external states to 
engage in civil conflict, even if this favours a non-democratic regime.  
 
2.3 Intervention and civil war duration 
Research has shown that foreign support for a government in civil war tends to 
prolong rather than shorten the civil conflict. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline find 
empirical support for their claim that long civil wars correspond to the equitable 
distribution of third party interventions (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000). They 
draw evidence from a data set of the Correlates Of War project consisting of 152 civil 
wars in the period 1820-1992 and show that as support for the government in civil 
war increases, the hazard rate decreases, corresponding to a lengthening of the 
duration of civil wars (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000). Regan has developed a 
new data set including consistent indexes for intra-state conflicts and external 
interventions from 1944 onwards. He shows that many interventions in civil war, 
especially those on the side of the government, do not necessarily have the purpose of 
solving the conflict but only to prevent defeat by the opposition. By reviving the 
government´s capacity to sustain the fight against the opposition foreign intervention 
extents the civil war (Regan, 2000). Luttwak follows up on this and states that third 
party interventions increase the heath of the conflict, resulting in an artificially 
stalemated conflict that is characterized by a higher rate of death and destruction in 
the long-run (Luttwak, 1999). Based on the data set of Regan (2000), Elbadawi and 
Sambanis (2000) found that out of 138 intra-state conflicts since 1944, 89 attracted 
external interventions by at least one external party. Crucially, the mean duration of 
civil wars that had ended and which had experienced foreign intervention was nine 
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years, while those wars that had ended but did not experience foreign intervention had 
a mean duration of 1.5 years (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000: 10).  
 
There is sufficient evidence to conclude that there is a causal relationship between 
foreign intervention and the prolonged duration of civil war. From the current 
literature a number of strengths and limitations can be drawn. First of all, the majority 
of the scholars agree that interventions are rarely motivated exclusively by efforts to 
end conflict and promote peace. Rather interventions are motivated by the desire to 
influence outcomes in the conflict country in ways favourable to the intervener 
(Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2005). A limitation however is that most studies that examine 
foreign intervention tend to focus on formal military interventions while in fact states 
rarely go as far as committing troops for action in other states (Salehyan, Gleditsch, 
Cunningham, 2003: 5). Rather, I will define external intervention as the unilateral 
intervention by a third party government in civil war in the form of military and 
financial assistance in favour of the government.   
 
Crucially, a substantial amount qualitative research has been devoted to proving a 
causal relationship between foreign intervention and prolonged civil war duration. 
However, a considerable less amount of attention is given to the underlying causal 
mechanisms, the processes and causal chains that lead foreign intervention to extent 
the duration of civil war. Hence my research question: How can foreign support to a 
government in civil war prolong the duration of the conflict? In the next I propose 
seven testable hypotheses that are possibly causal mechanisms that link foreign 
intervention with durable civil conflict. These hypotheses are based on existing 
research in the field of conflict studies. The causal mechanisms that these hypotheses 
Barnhoorn 1311298 
	   15	  
represent are not mutually exclusive and some of them are discussed by the same 
authors.  
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3. Theory and Hypotheses 
First and foremost, it is crucial to recognize the independent nature of foreign 
interventions. Civil wars produce windows of opportunity for third parties that want 
to pursue national security interests, claim resources or accomplish geopolitical goals 
(Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce, 2008). Therefore, an external party introduces new 
interests, preferences and possibly even veto´s to the conflict (Cunningham, 2006). 
This leads to diverging policy goals and possibly also diverging policy methods to 
combat the rebels. From this follows the first hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The diverging interests hypothesis 
Foreign intervention introduces new interests to the conflict, leading to diverging 
goals. This weakens the government´s capability to combat the rebels and thus 
prolongs the conflict.  
 
Related to this, a government that relies on external support to combat the rebels has 
limited space to deal with the rebels independently. Governments in civil war that are 
backed by external support face a potential trade off between increasing its military 
strength and maintaining its autonomy (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham, 2003: 5). 
In negotiations among multiple parties with diverging interests, the set of agreements 
that all parties will accept is smaller (Cunningham, 2006). Outside parties may be less 
willing to lay down arms and may pressure the government they support to continue 
to fight. In other words, the range of bargains that all parties would accept as opposed 
to continuing war is reduced significantly. Civil wars are complex to settle with the 
direct parties involved itself: The addition of a foreign actor makes the dispute even 
more complex and should lead to a longer civil war. From this we logically arrive at 
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the second hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The bargaining range hypothesis 
Foreign support to a government in civil war reduces the bargaining range of the 
government in conflict and therefore prolongs the duration of the conflict. 
 
Informational approaches to civil war look at the process of civil war as a constant 
change of information allowing parties to make assessments on their probability to 
win. Crucially, in multiparty conflicts the information revealed by the battlefield is 
difficult to interpret (Cunningham, 2006). According to Cunningham (2006), foreign 
intervention distorts information asymmetries because it manipulates the perceived 
costs of war. Outside interventions affect the transmission of this information and its 
content. A government that finds itself supported by an external actor may 
overestimate its chance of winning (Regan, 2002). In that case, a government in 
conflict may feel that confident that it becomes unwilling to do the necessary 
concessions that would lead to peace. Rebels on the other hand, may interpret the 
intervention as a sign of weakness and gain renewed motivation to continue to fight 
(Cunningham, 2006). In this way, information asymmetries caused by foreign 
intervention lead to distorted estimations of winning on both sides. Following the 
informational approach we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The information asymmetry hypothesis 
Foreign support for a government in civil war distorts information asymmetries and 
thus prolongs the conflict.  
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However, even with complete information, one side of the parties involved can decide 
to continue to fight because it cannot commit to a peace agreement. The credible 
commitment theory of civil war is one of the most intriguing theories of civil war and 
is one that is widely discussed among authors  (Salehyan, 2010; Salehyan, Gleditsch 
and Cunningham, 2010; Licklider, 2010). Such circumstances occur when waging 
war today can prevent one´s opponent from gaining military strength in the future 
(Blattman and Miguel, 2010:13). For example, a temporarily weak government may 
settle an agreement with a strong rebel group. However, when the state becomes 
stronger due to foreign support, it is likely that it will default on its earlier bargain 
again. A commitment problem arises when one party has the possibility to 
permanently alter the strategic balance by continuing to wage war (Powel, 2006; 
Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Seeing that a foreign actor can be a decisive factor in 
altering the balance of power towards the government, foreign intervention amplifies 
the credible commitment problem.  
 
On the side of the rebels, the credible commitment problem comes into place when a 
proposed agreement offers less than what the rebels can gain by continuing to fight. 
Seeing that agreement may be influenced by a foreign actor that the rebels fiercely 
oppose, the rebels may instead decide to continue to wage war to gain the highest 
possible payoff  (Blattman and Miguel, 2010:13). Recognizing that behind this 
renewed promise lies the interest of a foreign actor, possibly one that the rebel are 
opposed to in the first place, it is very likely that next to amplifying the credible 
commitment problem on the side of the government, a foreign actor negatively 
contributes the credible commitment problem on the side of the rebels as well. 
Therefore we expect the following:  
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Hypothesis 4: The credible commitment problem hypothesis 
Foreign support to a government in civil war amplifies the credible commitment 
problem and thus prolongs the conflict.  
 
When analysing the causal mechanisms that link foreign intervention to civil war 
duration it is important also to consider the strategy of intervention. By strategy we 
mean the mix of military, economic, financial or political instruments, as well as the 
way in which they are employed, to come to a certain outcome. Military and financial 
intervention is the most commonly type of intervention used (Pearson, 1974). 
According to Regan (2002), the use of force by an intervener is a critical aspect of the 
strategy. However, there is a significant amount of evidence that an overreliance on 
military means leads to a longer and more severe conflict in the long run. Stofft and 
Guertner (1995) found out that post Second World War interventions established 
precedents that lead to more bold and destabilizing behavior by governments. Claims 
that the imposition of military forces ¨stabilizes and pacifies¨ a target seem 
exaggerated in the light of the fact that all too frequently intervention is almost 
immediately followed by increased government repression, and a higher rate of 
deadly political violence (Pearson, 1974: 280). I therefore expect that:  
 
Hypothesis 5: The military-financial intervention hypothesis 
Foreign military and financial support to a government in civil war breeds civil 
conflict in the target and thus prolongs the duration of civil war.  
 
Having identified five possible causal mechanisms that could explain how foreign 
intervention prolongs the duration of civil war, I will now present an alternative 
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hypothesises. Like stated before, a government´s decision to fight can be viewed as a 
cost-benefit analysis. This calculus is influenced by a government´s perceived 
military capabilities relative to its opponent. Foreign intervention can manipulate this 
calculus by altering the balance of power and to an extent that the government is able 
to sustain the fight (Regan, 2002). This should either lead to a victory or make the 
opposition realize that the potential terms possible in negotiation have a higher utility 
than the outcome of further military contest (Regan, 2002). The alternative hypothesis 
is therefore:  
 
Hypothesis 6 (alternative): The balance of power hypothesis 
Foreign support for a government in civil war tilts the balance of power in favour of 
the government and should lead to a shorter civil war. 
 
In this chapter I have given evidence for the causal relationship between foreign 
intervention and prolonged civil war duration. Identifying the causal mechanisms that 
link these two variables would make these theories more complete and persuasive. In 
this section I have outlined five possible causal mechanisms. Having discussed the 
literature concerning foreign intervention in civil war and its possible prolonging 
effects, I will now proceed to explaining the methodology of my research where I will 
explain how I intend to test these hypotheses. 
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4. Research Method 
In this chapter I discuss the research method that I adopt to answer my research 
question: How does foreign support to a government in civil war affect the duration of 
the conflict? This question is built upon two assumptions. The first is that a foreign 
actor that intervenes in civil conflict pursues an independent agenda, represents a 
separate set of preferences and possesses the ability to pursue these interests. The 
second assumption is that while a foreign actor may intent to shorten the conflict at 
hand, foreign intervention in fact prolongs the duration of civil war. The research 
question implies a causal relationship. The literature review showed that there is proof 
of a causal effect between foreign intervention and the prolonged duration of civil 
war. However, causal insight is accomplished not only by measuring causal effects, 
but also requires the identification of causal mechanisms (Gerring, 2004). Assuming 
that foreign intervention prolongs the duration of civil war, this research looks 
specifically at the causal mechanisms that lead foreign intervention to prolong civil 
war. In the following paragraphs I will explain the methodology of my research, 
discuss the variables and analyse case selection.  
 
4.1 Concepts and measurements  
In this research, the independent variable is the foreign support for a government in 
civil conflict. Foreign support is defined as the financial and military support from 
one government given to another government. The dependent variable in this research 
is the duration of the civil war. This variable is defined as the time span between the 
start of the civil war and the signing of a formal peace agreement. The goal of this 
research is to uncover the causal relations between the independent and the dependent 
variable. The most suitable method to accomplish this goal is the case study method. 
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According to Gerring (2004), case studies allow one to peer into the box of causality 
to the intermediate causes lying between some cause and its purported effect. Ideally, 
they allow one to ¨see¨ X and Y interact. To make these causal links clearly visible I 
will use process-tracing. Process tracing refers to the examination of intermediate 
steps in a process to make inferences about hypotheses on how that process took place 
and whether and how it generated the outcome in question (Bennet and Checkel, 
2012). I will collect data using some primary but mostly secondary sources due to the 
biased and propagandist nature of most original materials. Because of its evidence 
gathering character, process-tracing and the case study research design are commonly 
associated with each other. In fact, the case study method is one of the most time-
honoured approaches to the study of civil conflict (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). One 
of its primary virtuous is the depth of analysis that it offers (Gerring, 2004: 8). 
Regarding this particular study, this is especially important given the invariant nature 
of the causal relationship that I am studying. On the other hand, the case study method 
falls short in representativeness, which is the extent to which causal mechanisms 
found within one unit can be assumed to be true for a larger set of units (Gerring, 
2004). This inherit weakness of the case study method is especially problematic when 
dealing with a strong confirmative study, however this study is of a more exploratory 
character. In this particular study, which focuses on causal mechanisms rather than 
causal effects, propositional depth is prized over breadth and case comparability is 
prized over representativeness.  
 
4.2 Data and Case Selection 
I adopt a multiple-case study method consisting of two cases that are literal 
replications (Yin, 2013). The research question focuses on the causal mechanisms 
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between the independent and dependent variable and therefore requires no variation 
on either variable (Ross, 2004). In other words, the research design requires two cases 
that experienced similar forms of foreign intervention within a similar context. The 
two cases that I have selected for my research are 1) US intervention in the Peruvian 
civil conflict starting in 1980 and 2) US intervention is the Colombian civil conflict 
starting in 1964. In the next paragraph I will verify my choice by explaining how 
these two cases meet the requirements and have experienced similar forms of 
intervention and experienced this intervention in a similar context.  
 
Peru and Colombia have experienced similar forms of US intervention throughout the 
time frame identified. Together with Bolivia, Peru and Colombia were part of the 
same ¨Andean¨ umbrella initiatives of the United States. Therefore, they have been 
dosed with similar levels of military and financial aid and have been subject to similar 
strategies. The motives of intervention on behalf of the United States have been 
largely the same for both countries during the Cold War and the decades thereafter.  
 
Additionally, this intervention occurred within a similar context. Both the Peruvian 
and Colombian civil conflicts erupted in the Cold War and are similar in character. 
The Peruvian government faces the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), a Communist 
guerrilla movement that seeks to replace what is sees as a ¨bourgeoisie democracy¨ 
with a socialist democracy. Similarly, the Colombian authorities are challenged by the 
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo), a 
guerrilla movement with similar goals. Both movements use similar guerrilla tactics 
and derive their income largely from drug trafficking. What is also important to 
mention, is that both movements developed in a similar economic and political 
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environment with a relatively weak government and widespread social and economic 
unrest. It is in this context that the Shining Path and FARC have been able to increase 
their support base.  
 
According to George and Bennett, one of the most common critiques of case study 
methods is that they are particularly prone to ¨selection bias¨ (George and Bennett, 
2005: 22). This issue however, does not concern this particular research, since cases 
with similar outcomes were deliberately chosen. George and Bennett state that 
deliberate selection on the independent of dependent variable is justified when serving 
the heuristic purpose of identifying the potential causal paths and variables leading to 
the dependent variable of interest (George and Bennett, 2005: 23). And this is exactly 
what this study aims to do.  
 
Qualitative case studies like this one, have successfully illustrated causal dynamics of 
civil conflict in the past (Collier and Sambanis, 2005; Fearon and Laitin, 2005; Walter 
and Snyder, 1999). While generalization remains a problem, case studies can 
illuminate causal relations, generate new hypothesis for testing and stimulate accurate 
or more innovative data collection. The methodology and case selection that I have 
explained above provide a solid base for this research. Therefore, I will now proceed 
to uncover the causal mechanisms that show that US intervention played a clear role 
in extending the duration of the Colombian and Peruvian civil conflict.  
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5. Background 
Before analysing how US intervention has possibly prolonged the Peruvian and 
Colombian civil conflict, it is important to get a complete understanding of the 
conflicts. In the methodology chapter I verified my choice for the Colombian and 
Peruvian civil conflict because of it similar contexts and intervention. This 
background chapter aims to explore exactly those aspects and is structured as follows. 
In the first section, I will examine the contextual problems of Peru and Colombia that 
set the stage for the emergence of the Shining Path and the FARC. In the second 
section, I will dig into the core of the Peruvian and Colombian conflict and analyse 
the challenges posed by the Shining Path and the FARC. In the final section, I will 
examine subsequent US intervention.  
 
5.1 Section one: The contextual problems Colombian and Peruvian conflict  
One of the principle casualties of the Peruvian and Colombian conflict is historical 
perspective. The majority of the literature portrays the Peruvian and Colombian 
conflict as one between the government and the guerrillas. However, to perceive Peru 
and Colombia merely as a host to guerrilla activity is to completely misunderstand the 
conflict at hand. Unfortunately, this is precisely how they have become to be viewed 
in the past decades. While it is true that both conflicts principally evolve around the 
government and their respective guerrilla movements, it would be wrong to treat these 
conflicts in isolation of the context they developed in. The following section explores 
the tapestry of historical and contextual elements that set the stage for the emergence 
of Peru´s Shining Path and Colombia´s FARC.  
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5.1.1 Weak governance 
The principle factor that has contributed to the emergence of the Shining Path and the 
FARC is weak governance. Colombia is one of the oldest Latin American 
democracies, but it is a very weak one. Corruption is evident throughout all layers of 
the political and judicial system. Colombia´s pronounced political fragmentation has 
served as the backdrop for numerous assorted power plays (Rochlin, 2011: 716). In 
the absence of a centralized state the country has been struck by violence numerous 
times. Many communist peasants grouped together to form self-defence movements, 
seeing waging war as the only way to challenge the government (Leech, 2002: 14). In 
the 1960s, the unification of several of these peasant movements led to the formation 
of the FARC, which became Colombia´s largest guerrilla group. Next to this, a 
substantial amount of private armies were created such as the Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional (ELN) and Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). According to Schulz, 
these paramilitary organizations started as self-defence organizations consisting of 
landowners, political figures and the military, to provide civilians with protection 
from the FARC (Schulz, 1999: 216). But as these groups expanded, they became 
increasingly concerned with their own agenda. Soon their goals went far beyond 
protecting the population from guerrilla demands, as they started to ¨cleanse¨ entire 
regions of possible subversives (Leech, 2002: 19).  
 
The Peruvian conflict finds its roots in weak governance as well. Peru is a democracy 
too, but a relatively new one due to its turbulent political history with alternating 
periods of democracy and authoritarian rule. Peru´s most recent democratic transition 
occurred in 1980 after 12 years of military rule (CRS, 2009: 1). During the first 10 
years of democracy the country was struck by a deep economic crisis. The leftist 
Barnhoorn 1311298 
	   27	  
president Alan García (1985-1990) pursued an antagonistic relationship with the 
international financial community and excessive spending on social programs led to 
hyperinflation and a debt crisis (CRS, 2009: 1). The subsequent president, Alberto 
Fujimori took a drastic turn and implemented an aggressive economic reform 
program. In 1992, he initiated a ¨self-coup¨ dissolving the legislature and calling a 
constituent assembly to write a new constitution (CRS, 2009: 1). He became 
increasingly regarded as an authoritarian leader and his actions led to a serious 
erosion of Peru´s already fragile democratic institutions. Due to revelations of high-
level corruption and human rights violations, Fujimori resigned in 2000 and flew to 
Japan. The current President Ollanta Humala has accomplished remarkable levels of 
economic growth, but does face a deep social crisis caused by economic inequalities.  
 
5.1.2 Economic problems and social unrest 
Due to weak governance the Colombian and Peruvian government have failed to 
solve the deep-rooted social-economic problems that lie at the heart of both civil 
conflicts. Most problems are concentrated in the agrarian sector. Rural poverty and 
other chronic problems are magnified due to a vast inequality of wealth, issues of land 
tenure and the dubious legitimacy of electoral politics (Rochlin, 2003: 30). While the 
endemic violence is partially responsible for Colombia´s and Peru´s economic 
decline, it is not the principle cause (Leech, 2002: 44). Since the swift implementation 
of neoliberal policies in the 1980s, both countries have struggled. While Colombia is 
still one of the poorest countries of Latin America, Peru has in fact experienced a 
remarkable growth rate in the past decade (CRS, 2009: 5). This has caused a lot of 
social unrest, as Peru´s poor feel that the country´s economic prosperity has not 
reached them (CRS, 2009: 5). The Peruvian government, still recovering from the 
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democratic erosion in the 1990s, has difficulties dealing with this social tension. In 
theory, political power is highly centralized in Lima, but messages emanating from 
the capital lack legitimacy in most regions of the country (Rochlin, 2003: 29). In Peru 
and Colombia, in many regions economic enterprise operates completely outside 
government structures (Rochlin, 2011: 719). It is in the context of these social-
economic problems that an acceleration of the war economy has taken place, which is 
stirred principally by the coca-trade.  
 
5.1.3 The drug industry 
The narcotics industry adds to the Peruvian and Colombian conflict a complex 
dimension. Narcotrafficking and its related criminal activities have boomed since the 
cocaine revolution in the 1980s and the subsequent voracious demand for drugs in de 
United States and Europe. The drug industry has found room to flourish especially in 
the Andean countries (Peru, Bolivia and Colombia) because of extreme poverty and 
the lack of centralized authority (Youngers & Rosin, 2005: 3). This highly profitable 
industry induces drug-trafficking related corruption across the entire political and 
judicial spectrum. But most of all it provides armed groups, including the Shining 
Path and the FARC, with financial and military resources. Up until today the drug 
cartels remain one of the most powerful and obscure agents in the Colombian and 
Peruvian conflict.  
 
In this section I have identified the three major contextual problems of Colombia and 
Peru. In the next section I will explain how the Shining Path and the FARC have 
benefitted from this context and grown into yet an even bigger challenge that the 
Colombian and Peruvian government have to face.  
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5.2 Section two: The Shining Path and the FARC   
It is against the backdrop of weak governance, social economic problems and the 
emergence of the drug industry, that the FARC and Shining Path have been able to 
increase their power and influence. At its peak from 1989 to 1992, Sendero was 
clearly the most powerful and brutal guerilla movement in Latin America (Rochlin, 
2003: 1). The FARC managed to exacerbate the chaos and mayhem in Colombia to 
the point that it represented the America´s most significant strategic crisis at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century (Rochlin, 2003: 2). How did what started as 
small belligerent movements, grow into such a significant threat?  
 
5.2.1 Foundations and ideology 
It was during the Second Conference of the Guerrilla Block of Southern Colombia in 
1966 that the FARC was founded (Lee, 2012:30). The movement is a Marxist-
Leninist revolutionary guerrilla organization that derives its support principally from 
the countryside. The FARC says it represents rural Colombia against the economic 
depreciation caused by the ruling elite, the repressive violence caused by the state´s 
military and the paramilitary armies, the exploitation of natural resources by 
multinational companies and the political influence vested in neo-imperialism of the 
United States. Its central objectives are land redistribution and a more equitable 
division of wealth. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the FARC steadily grew in 
numbers. Towards the end of the 1970s, FARC membership was up to 1.000 soldiers 
situated in the jungles of Guaviara, Caquetá and Putumay.  
 
The Shining Path emerged somewhat later than the FARC (in 1980), but rapidly grew 
into a potent and ferocious guerrilla force. Similar to the FARC, the Shining Path is a 
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Communist-based guerrilla movement, but it finds its uniqueness in a highly violent 
and rigid neo-Maoist ideology (Rochlin, 2003: 23). The movement was created by 
Abimael Guzmán, who presided in a dictatorial fashion through a notorious cult of 
leadership (Rochlin, 2003: 23). The Shining Path´s main goal was to destroy the 
existing Peruvian political institutions and replace them with a communist peasant 
revolutionary regime (Lucero, 2008). Guzmán afforded an important role to violence 
within the context of revolutionary struggle. The need to combat imperialism is 
another important feature of the movement´s ideology. Guzman denounced the US as 
the main agent of imperialism in Peru (Starn, 1995: 407). While there are many 
similarities between the Shining Path and the FARC, the Shining Path´s ideology is 
probably more exclusive, rigid and dogmatic. What else is unique is the way it plays 
into ethnic cleavages and secures firm indigenous support by resurrecting the 
historical greatness of the of the Inca civilization. In this line, it is no surprise that the 
Shining Path is often called the most complex, idiosyncratic, and destructive politico-
military movement in twentieth century Latin America (Loveman, 1994: 205). 
 
5.2.2 The Shining Path´s and the FARC´s rise to power 
It was in 1980 when the Shining Path initiated its campaign. The movement was 
based in the rural areas of Ayacucho and Huanta and had approximately ten to fifteen 
thousand members (Lucero, 2008). The state´s refusal to acknowledge the Shining 
Path´s existence and its lack of military credibility gave the Shining Path the 
opportunity to deploy its forces to wage an effective guerrilla war against its enemies 
with near impunity (Lucero, 2008). In 1983 this policy of denial on behalf of the state 
changed abruptly into a disastrous deployment of state terror. The government 
adopted aggressive tactics in an attempt to destroy any popular sentiment held 
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towards the guerrillas. The Shining Path was displaced but then firmly established 
itself in the Upper Huallage Valley, one of Peru´s biggest coca regions. With an 
economy in recession, coca production boomed because it provided local farmers 
with a stable income and with larger profits than commercial crops. The precise 
relationship between the rebel movements and the drug trade remains hotly contested. 
Initially, the FARC and Shining Path denied their relation to the drug trade other than 
claiming to represent the political interests of the coca-farmers (Lee, 2012: 34). Soon 
though, both movements expanded their operations in the drug industry by 
maintaining a system of taxation on the production that took place in territories they 
control. Ever since, the drug-industry has become their main financial source to fund 
their military operations (Stokes, 2005). With help of the thriving cocaine industry, 
the Shining Path and the FARC experienced a major surge in power. During the 
1980s they transformed from small, beleaguered guerrilla movements into major 
belligerent forces financed by organized crime. Nevertheless, both movements 
adopted unique strategies in their bid for power. The FARC for example, made a 
serious attempt to participate in formal politics while the Shining Path´s adopted 
different propaganda methods to target specific groups. This will be illustrated in the 
next two paragraphs.  
 
5.2.3 The FARC´s short political history 
It was in 1985 that the FARC officially entered politics through the formation of a 
political party called the Union Patriótica (Patriotic Union – UP) (Lee, 2012: 30). 
During its electoral debut the UP scored relatively well but tragically, the UP entrance 
in the political realm was followed by a major disruption of political violence. 
According to Mendez (1990), Rochlin (2003) and Tolle (2003), between 2000 and 
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4000 UP adherents were assassinated over a four-year period. In addition to this, 
President Garciá launched a military attack against the FARC in 1990 without 
warning, killing the ideological cofounder of the FARC, Jacobo Arenas (Rochlin, 
2012: 721). According to Rochlin, these devastating experiences solidified the 
group´s argument for the necessity of armed struggle (Rochlin, 2003: 132). Seeing 
their distrust in the government reaffirmed, the FARC ended the UP experiment and 
alternatively increased its engagement in crime and up-scaled its military action. In 
the early 1990s the FARC had between 7.000 and 10.000 fighters spread over 70 
fronts and inflicted numerous attacks on the Colombian military. Within a decade the 
FARC had turned into a military machine with a serious chance to topple the state. 
 
5.2.4 The Shining Path´s variety of tactics 
The Shining Path did not attempt to engage in politics but made effective use of 
various propaganda tactics. Skilful indoctrinating methods were employed to engage 
those in the general population who were experiencing the greatest degrees of 
injustice caused by the Peruvian authorities. Despite some common themes, it is 
difficult to pinpoint exactly the Shining Path´s tactics and ideology as it made 
effective use of traditional class cleavages, historical struggles and resentment against 
the religious and military institutions of non-Indian Peru. The Shining Path became 
known for sending out death threats to those they saw as agents of capitalism 
(Bejarano, 2013). In a few coca producing key areas, this strategy was modified. 
Instead of indoctrinating the coca farmers, the Shining Path specifically addressed 
their grievances against the government forces and drug traffickers so that the farmers 
began to regard the movement as an ally (Bejarano, 2013). Next to this, the Shining 
Path drastically downplayed its Maoist rhetoric of anti-capitalism, understanding that 
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support was based more on protecting and expanding coca crop profits than on the 
political cause of the Shining Path itself (Bejarano, 2013). 
 
5.2.5 The guerrilla’s bid for power 
Around 1990 the Shining Path reached its peak with armed membership swelling to 
over 23.000 soldiers (Rochlin, 2003: 63). Not only had the movement consolidated 
power in key strategic areas of the country-side but the Shining Path was now close to 
conquering the urban terrain of Lima as well (Rochlin, 2003: 63). According to 
Rochlin, the Shining Paths´s strategy at this time was extremely violent and now 
graduated to an extraordinary brutality that at times appeared sadistic (Rochlin, 2003: 
63). Both the FARC and the Shining Path employed tactics like random car 
bombings, power outages, kidnappings, the destruction of infrastructure and political 
assassinations. The FARC tried to gain greater presence throughout urban Colombia 
as well. In 1996, the rebels overtook the Colombian military force on several 
occasions, but the greatest victory of all was the creation of the Zona de Distensión 
(demilitarized zone) (Rochlin, 2012: 722). In an attempt to solidify peace talks, 
President Pastrana ceded a section of the country as large as Switzerland. Predictably, 
the FARC used this territory for guerrilla training and narco-trafficking. But perhaps 
even more important, it strengthened the FARC´s believe that it could force 
concessions from a seemingly week government (Barón, 2001). By the late 1990s the 
FARC had a military support base of 17.000 troops spread over 60 fronts. When an 
attempt to seize Bogota failed, they intensified the rate of urban terror trying to 
increase their negotiating power. It was not until this point of time, when the Shining 
Path and the FARC had become extremely powerful and threatening, that the 
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Colombian and Peruvian government took far-reaching measurements to limit their 
influence. I will discuss their actions in the following paragraphs.  
 
5.2.6 The decline of the Shining Path and the FARC  
In Peru, it was under the Fujimori presidency that far-reaching measures were taken 
to eliminate the Shining Path´s expanding power. His self-initiated coup in 1992 
allowed him to temporarily rule by decree and legitimized the use of violence. 
Fujimori used intimidation to threaten local citizens and tortured and assassinated 
citizens for their alleged backing or sympathy for Shining Path (Bejarano, 2013). The 
Peruvian population suffered from wide spread human rights abuses from both the 
Shining Path as well as the government forces. Due to its extreme and unpredictable 
use of violence, the Shining Path failed to capture the hearts and minds of the people. 
The ¨people´s revolution¨ had been transformed into a stark violent struggle where 
ideology was nowhere near to be found. Incredibly, the group´s power base 
evaporated almost instantly following the capture of its charismatic and dictatorial 
leader in 1992 (Rochlin, 2003: 3). The group began to disintegrate and the level of 
violence diminished significantly.  
 
Also the FARC started to face intensified pressure from the government, although this 
happened only at the turn of the millennium during the Uribe administration. With the 
help of the US, the government was able to launch a large counter-insurgency against 
the FARC. As a result, the FARC encountered some serious blows. In 2008, an attack 
by US-Columbian forces against a FARC base in Ecuador killed the group´s second 
in command, Raúl Reyes and 24 others (Rochlin, 2012: 738). In the same year the 
group lost FARC Commander Tomas Medina (killed by US-Columbian forces near 
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the Venezuelan border), Iván Ríos (assassinated by his own bodyguard for a monetary 
reward from the government) and Comandante Karina Eldaneyis Mosquera, the 
FARC´s most senior female leader (she surrendered). On top of that, they lost their 
ultimate leader, Manuel Marulanda who died from a heart attack. These losses were a 
serious blow to the morale of the organization, but also damaged what had been very 
consistent and experienced leadership for many years. In addition to this, the 
intensified level of terror has diminished the FARC´s wider ideological appeal. 
Similar to the Shining Path, the FARC has lost much of its revolutionary commitment 
and acts more like a large criminal enterprise (Marcella and Schulz, 1999: 215). 
However, despite the military losses, lack of leadership and diminishing ideological 
commitment, the FARC and the Shining Path are no-where being completely 
defeated.  
 
5.2 7 A never-ending conflict? 
Up to today, the FARC and to a lesser extent the Shining Path, form a threat against 
the Peruvian and Colombian government. Drug trafficking continues to fuel their 
military capacity and financial resources. Experts say that the Shining Path has 
between 200 and 800 members and that the two factions in which the Shining Path 
split during the 1990s appear to be cooperating again (CRS, 2009). Different to the 
Peruvian government, who refuses to negotiate with the Shining Path, the FARC has 
become increasingly responsive to peace talks. Over the past years, the FARC has 
released most of its civilian and political hostages and in 2012 exploratory peace talks 
were initiated. The capacity of the FARC and Shining Path should not be 
underestimated though. On the contrary, the movements seem better armed then 
before, using rocket launchers and heavy machine guns that are possibly stolen from 
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the military or acquired from drug cartels (CRS, 2009). In response to renewed 
guerrilla activity, the Peruvian authorities have re-opened several military bases and 
increased policy presence in some critical regions (CRS, 2009). Similarly, the 
Colombian government remains extremely careful, since as long as the political 
kidnappings, public terror and attacks of infrastructure continue to disrupt the peace 
process, the FARC is not finished. 
 
In the last two sections I have examined the emergence of the Shining Path and the 
FARC and analysed the contextual problems that facilitated this. Having acquired a 
complete view of the conflicts and a full understanding of the contextual problems it 
is time to examine the involvement of the US.  
 
5.3 Section three: US intervention  
This section examines how US intervention took shape, which strategies were 
adopted and which goals were pursued. US intervention in the Peruvian and 
Colombian conflict is characterized by two dimensions; a counter-insurgency 
dimension and an anti-drug dimension. In the following paragraphs I am going to 
explore how these dimensions relate to each other and have evolved over the past 
decades. In order to fully understand the nature and the goals of US intervention in 
Peru and Colombia it is sometimes necessary to look at the US´s approach towards 
Latin America as whole. It is therefore that I will start this section with a short 
examination of US policy towards Latin America before its intervention in the 
Colombian and Peruvian civil war.  
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5.3.1 Trade and expanding economic ties 
The rapid growth of the US as a political and economic hegemony in the first half of 
the twentieth century had a big influence on Latin American affairs. For a great part, 
this was due to the fact that the US became Latin America´s biggest trade partner and 
became Latin America´s leading supplier of private capital and intergovernmental 
loans and aid (Bonfatte, 2005: 6). When investments were under threat, the US did 
not hesitate to intervene in the internal affairs of Latin American countries and help 
the political elite to crush rebellions (e.g.: Guatemala 1920, Dominican Republic 
1916-1924 and Cuba 1917-1933) (Bonfatte, 2005: 6). The US invoked the Roosevelt 
Corollary (a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823) to justify such military 
intervention. While the Roosevelt Corollary was meant to defend Latin American 
countries from European imperialist intentions, critics argue that it served as a means 
to obtain concessions and privileges in the interest of American corporations 
(Chomsky, 2004). The rise of reformist parties and the eruption of the Cold War 
however, led to a lot of uncertainty on behalf of the Americans. 
 
5.3.2 The Cold War: Combatting leftist guerrilla forces 
During the 1960s and 1970s the US tried to actively eliminate the spread of Soviet-
backed communism by giving aid to centralist parties, covert CIA interventions in 
elections, supporting military coups and combatting leftist guerrilla forces. Concerned 
with national security and economic interest, the US followed Peru and Colombia 
with a suspicious eye towards the emergence of the Communist-based Shining Path 
and the FARC. US intervention in the Peruvian and Colombian conflict during the 
Cold War was highly focussed on counter-insurgency. The US encouraged Peru and 
Colombia to strengthen counter-insurgency programs by transferring weapons and 
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equipment, intelligence sharing and joint exercises. The Foreign Assistance Act 
(FAA) of 1961 put most Defence Department spending on foreign military aid under 
supervision of the State Department. The Military Assistance Program (MAP), 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) and the Foreign Military 
Financing program (FMF) made up the vast bulk of Washington´s military transfers. 
Between 1980 and 1991 the MAP and FMF contributed more than $2 billion to Latin 
America´s security forces while IMET added another $110 million (Isacson, 2005: 
17). Next to political intervention, the US also interfered in the economic affairs of 
Peru and Colombia. Economic intervention was embodied by the Washington 
Consensus, which involved a set of economic policy prescriptions constituted by 
Washington-based institutions like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the US Treasury Department. Such prescriptions included economic 
opening with regard to trade and foreign direct investment, the expansion of 
privatization and the retreat of the state. The Alliance for Progress was launched to 
familiarize the Peruvian and Colombian population with the American culture. 
However, these policies failed to address the deep-rooted social economic problems 
of Peruvian and Colombian society. It is therefore not a surprise that when the cocaine 
boom began in the 1980s, the lure of drug profits resulted in the massive cultivation 
of coca plants in the pre-dominantly guerrilla controlled regions providing those 
guerrilla movements with financial and military leverage (Leech, 2002:17). 
 
5.3.3 The War on Drugs: Combatting narcotrafficking 
The end of the Cold War marked the end of the US obsession with Communism, yet 
did not end US intervention. On the contrary, the US redirected its focus on other 
national interests. While financial and military assistance to Colombia and Peru had 
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already been profound, it was not until the 1980s that the floodgates of US money and 
weapons opened in the service of the ¨war on drugs¨. Since then, with only low-level 
coverage by the US media and almost no public debate on the matter, the US has 
stepped deeper and deeper into Peru´s and Colombia´s civil conflict (Leech, 2002: 2).  
 
In responds to the booming cocaine industry and its domestic drug problem, the US 
insisted on an overseas military solution focused on interdiction and eradication. In 
the 1980s, the Reagan administration introduced the term ¨narco-guerilla¨ as a means 
of demonizing the Shining Path and the FARC by linking them to international drug 
trafficking (Leech, 2002: 62). By doing so, the US justified the militarization of the 
war on drugs. In 1989 George W. Bush (Senior) launched the Andean Initiative. The 
centrepiece of the Andean Initiative was to empower Colombian, Peruvian and 
Bolivian military and police forces to carry out counter drug initiatives, and 
significant US training and support was provided to those forces willing to collaborate 
(Youngers & Rosin, 2005: 3). In 1990 the funds totalled $231.6 million of which all 
but $48.6 million was spent on military and police assistance (Isacson, 2005: 3). The 
amount of aid increased rapidly. For example, in 1989 military and police aid for 
Colombia had been $18 million while in 1990 this amount had jumped to $93 million 
(Isacson, 2005: 3). Evidently, the focal point of US intervention had shifted from 
counter-insurgency to counter-narcotics.  
 
5.3.4 Eradication and interdiction 
At the onset of the Andean Drug War, the Shining Path and FARC had already 
established a powerful alliance between poverty stricken coca farmers and cocaine 
dealers. The growing intervention of the US added yet another dimension to the 
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conflict. With the aim of stifling the production of coca at its roots, the principle 
method adopted was manual eradication. The State Department´s Bureau for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) was and still is responsible for 
the eradication program’s day to day operations in cooperation with local forces, 
while Southcom, the regional command, trains military units responsible for 
protecting and carrying out manual eradication and participates in intelligence to 
determine which areas to eradicate (Isacson, 2005: 33). In Peru, CORAH teams were 
occupied with the execution of eradication program using methods like burning, 
cutting and digging op the roots. However, this proved not to be a very effective 
method (Bejarano, 2003). Additionally, many CORAH workers suffered severe 
attacks from the Shining Path and local farmers. The increasing amount attacks on 
eradication teams displayed the ineffectiveness of the US´s eradication programs and 
the government´s incompetency against the insurgents and forced the US and 
Peruvian authorities to adopt a different strategy in the 1990s. A policy of interdiction 
was adopted, targeting cocaine laboratories, trafficker´s airstrips and the drug 
traffickers themselves (Bejarano, 2003). An aerial interdiction program known as the 
Airbridge Denial Program (sometimes called the ¨shootdown policy¨) aimed to break 
the link between Bolivian and Peruvian coca fields and the criminal-run processing 
centres in Colombia. The program was suspended in 2001 after the Peruvian air-force, 
acting on US intelligence, accidently shot down a passenger plane carrying a family 
of US missionaries (Isacson, 2005: 32). Nevertheless, the interdiction program did in 
fact successfully eliminate the production of coca in Peru and temporarily reduced the 
Shining Path´s financial leverage. However, the successful elimination of coca 
production in Peru, shifted coca production to Colombia, which led to an intensified 
anti-drug program in that country.  
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5.3.5 Fumigation 
In order to eliminate the growing coca production in Colombia, the US adopted an 
intense fumigation strategy. In the late 1990s the first fumigation campaign was 
launched whereby US supplied helicopters with US pilots sprayed vast amounts of 
toxics over coca producing fields (Leech, 2002: 66). Within a few months, 62.000 
acres of coca had been destroyed, and the US and Colombia called the initial 
campaign a success. Soon it became clear though that more than just coca had been 
eradicated, as the deadly mist turned food crops brown and made children and 
animals sick. Moreover, the fumigation campaigns completely undermined the 
Colombian government´s crop substitution program by indiscriminately destroying 
legal and illegal crops (Leech, 2002: 73). As part of the extremely militaristic 
approach in Peru and Colombia, rural poverty and the other economic causes of coca 
cultivation were largely ignored (Leech, 2002: 24). The growing involvement of the 
United States in the war against drugs provided the Shining Path and the FARC with 
an opportunity to produce a nationalist rhetoric which helped justify its use of 
violence and solidified its relationship with the farmers and the drug-traffickers 
(Bejarano, 2003). As the FARC and the Shining Path grew in power, the US adopted 
a more counter-insurgency approach again. In the next paragraphs I will explore this 
shift.  
 
5.3.6 The Fujimori crackdown 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Shining Path posed a more serious threat than 
any other Latin American insurgency at the time (Vallas, 2003: 4). Despite resistance 
from the Peruvian government, so far the US had only been willing to give military 
aid for the purpose of eradication and interdiction. While the Peruvian government 
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viewed the insurgency as the first and most pressing problem, according to 
Washington it was the cocaine industry that destabilized the country and should be 
tackled at first. Seeing that previous eradication and interdiction effort failed to solve, 
or rather exacerbated the civil conflict, the US government finally decided to help the 
Peruvian state to combat the Shining Path first. During the Presidency of Fujimori, 
counter-insurgency strategies were intensified with great success. By 1995 the leader 
of the Shining Path had been captured and the movement was significantly weakened.  
 
5.3.7 Plan Colombia 
According to Rochlin, this strategic endeavour may have foreshadowed an increasing 
tendency by the US and Latin-American governments towards counter-insurgency 
based warfare, which was later used to a great degree in the case of Colombia 
(Rochlin, 2003: 256). US military and financial aid was temporarily reduced during 
the Clinton administration but was abruptly intensified as a result of the creation of a 
demilitarized zone in 1998. By then, the FARC processed an estimated 17.000 troops 
spread over 60 fronts. Concerned with the growing strength of the FARC the US 
devised Plan Colombia, a $7.5 billion Plan that would end the Columbian civil war, 
revive its economy and curtail cocaine production (Leech, 2002: 63). Plan Columbia 
was first and foremost a military aid program with more than 75 per cent of the 
package reserved for military and police aid (Rochlin, 2011: 726). This funded 
counter counterdrug battalions, helicopters, aircrafts and equipment for the 
Colombian police (Isacson, 2005: 46). The US contracted private corporations for the 
execution of many of its operations. By 2003, at least 16 US companies were present 
in Colombia (Rochlin, 2011: 727). Not only did this satisfy the domestic arms 
industry, the privatization of warfare served the purpose of attracting as little media 
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attention as possible (Rochlin, 2011: 727; Isacson, 2005: 44). Another important 
aspect of Plan Columbia was its careful consideration of intelligence and asymmetric 
warfare. Facing a well-funded, efficient and dispersed guerrilla group, the US 
government helped the Columbian military by making it quicker, equipped with better 
intelligence, and better capable of fighting in difficult terrain (Rochlin, 2011: 729).  
 
5.3.8 The War on Terror: Combatting terrorism  
Despite many of its shortcomings and brutalities, the overly militaristic approach of 
the US did in fact significantly weaken the FARC and the Shining Path. Between 
1999 and 2001 the Colombian government and the FARC made several attempt to 
reach a peace agreement but failed because of the government´s failure and refusal to 
dismantle the paramilitaries or the FARC´s refusal to do any serious peace 
concessions. When the FARC and the Colombian government were close to reach a 
cease-fire agreement in April 2002, they hit upon another stumbling block. Following 
the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, the rhetoric 
emanating from Washington under the presidency of George Bush shifted from 
emphasizing the FARC´s role in the drug trade to the rebel group´s place on the US 
State Department´s list of terrorist organizations. According to Isacson, President 
Bush has been much less reluctant to execute counterinsurgency programs than his 
precedents. Since then, for many in Washington the ¨war on drugs¨ and the ¨war on 
terror¨ have become virtually indistinguishable.  
 
While the military interventions in Peru and Colombia have debilitated the FARC and 
the Shining Path militarily, they have failed to eliminate the root causes for the 
existence of these leftist rebels in the first place (Rochlin, 2011: 740). In Colombia, 
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economic and political instability is still widely evident and the drug industry still 
poses a big challenge. In Peru, after a period of relative peace and stability, the 
insurgency seems to be on the rise again. This resurgence is widely associated with 
the loosening grip of Peru´s government on narcotics control (Vallas, 2003: 166). 
Consequently, US aid towards Peru has been on the increase again. In 2009 for 
example US financial assistance included $37 million for the Andean Counterdrug 
program (now part of the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 
Assistance account), $63 million in Development Assistance, $750.000 for Foreign 
Military Financing and $400.000 for International Military Education and Training 
(CRS, 2009:7). Also Colombia continues to be a large recipient of US finance.  
 
Having acquired a full understanding of the Colombian and Peruvian contextual 
problems, the development of the Shining Path and the FARC and the nature of US 
intervention I will now proceed to unravelling the causal mechanisms to investigate 
how US intervention has prolonged the Peruvian and Colombian civil war. 
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6. Empirical Results 
In the following chapter the hypotheses will be tested against the case studies of the 
Peruvian and Colombian civil war. This will determine what causal mechanisms lead 
foreign intervention to cause a longer duration of civil war. 
 
6.1 Diverging interests  
We established the independent nature of foreign actors and the fact that intervention 
is driven by self-interest. From this followed our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The diverging interests hypothesis 
Foreign intervention introduces new interests to the conflict, leading to diverging 
goals. This weakens the government´s capability to combat the rebels and thus 
prolongs the conflict.  
 
The principle question that should be asked is, what are the true intentions of US 
intervention and how do they compare with the interests of the Peruvian and 
Colombian government? The primary interest of the Peruvian and Colombian 
government is to stop that factor that poses the biggest challenge to stable 
governance: The insurgency of the Shining Path and the FARC. A close assessment 
of the conflict and US intervention over the past decades reveals that for the US 
counter-insurgency is an important strategy not its principle goal. Most of the 
literature points at national security concerns as the overarching goal of US 
intervention. Counter-insurgency and counter-narcotic programs alternated each other 
to serve this purpose. This can be shown as follows.  
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During the Cold War, the US followed Colombia and Peru with a cautious eye to its 
leftist insurgencies and encouraged Colombia and Peru to adopt counterinsurgency 
doctrines, which emphasized irregular military and paramilitary operations alongside 
the general population to weaken and root out a perceived communist threat (Isacson 
in Youngers & Rosin, 2005: 17). According to Isacson, counterdrug-aid programs 
began during the 1970s but at this point of time they were dwarfed by 
counterinsurgency security assistance (Isacson, 2005: 19). As the Cold War was 
drawing to a close and Soviet influence diminished, a new mission began to reveal it 
self. Reviving the phrase ¨war on drugs¨, illicit drugs were presented as the new 
primary threat to US national security (Youngers & Roslin, 2005: 22). Eradication 
and interdiction efforts in Peru and an intense fumigation campaign in Colombia 
intensified US intervention in the Peruvian and Colombian conflict.  
 
While increasing the anti-drug effort the US undermined the Peruvian and Colombian 
government´s capability to deal with their goal, fighting the insurgency. This 
happened in the following way. First of all, US counternarcotic programs failed to 
address the social economic problems that surrounded the drug industry. Rather, this 
campaign fuelled violence and created a united front among coca farmers, guerrillas 
and narco-traffickers. Both the Shining Path and the FARC profited enormously from 
this relationship, which gave them the financial means to execute their military 
campaigns. Moreover, the ¨war on drugs¨ proved to be a valuable recruiting, 
mobilizing and propaganda tool for the guerrillas (Bejarano, 2003). By expanding 
their financial means, military capacity and support base the FARC and the Shining 
Path were are able to pose a serious challenge to the Peruvian and Colombian 
government throughout the 1990s.  
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The extreme focus on drugs encouraged also other power plays. In Colombia this 
effect was especially devastating. By focussing explicitly on countering narcotics and 
without addressing the other actors involved in the conflict, US policy has weakened 
the state´s ability to deal with the paramilitary violence (Marcella and Schulz, 1999: 
213). The US´ disregard of the paramilitary conflict has contributed to a militarization 
and disintegration of Columbia. In Peru, the counternarcotic campaign did in fact 
diminish the resource capacity the Shining Path but this was accomplished at the cost 
of immense levels of public terror (Fielding, 2012: 851). Thus, by explicitly focusing 
on narcotics and ignoring the other contributing actors in the Peruvian and Colombian 
conflict, the US undermined its own anti-drug campaign but most of all deepened and 
expanded the civil disputes.  
 
As a result, the metaphorical ¨war on drugs¨ became all too real a battlefield 
(Youngers & Rosin, 2005: 3). Viewing the Peruvian and Colombian conflict through 
the lens of a national security concern, the US came to adopt an increasingly 
militaristic strategy geared towards counter-insurgency again. In Peru, the US 
responded to the Peruvian government´s demand to help tackle the guerillas first and 
this proved to be quite successful. With the help of the United States, Fujimori 
reversed a ten-year record of strategic failure on the part of the state by employing 
intelligence operations to obliterate the Shining Path. Given its pyramid structure, the 
Shining Path represented a perfect target for this strategy (Rochlin, 2003: 256). This 
strategic endeavour may have foreshadowed an intensification of counterinsurgency 
tactics in Colombia. Concerned with the growing strength of the FARC and related 
criminal activities, the US devised Plan Colombia. The US careful attention to 
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asymmetric warfare, intelligence and surveillance significantly weakened the FARC. 
At this point, the US´ goals and strategies were more in line with those of the 
Colombian and Peruvian government and as a result, the insurgency was more 
effectively reduced in power and relative stability was accomplished.  
 
According to Lindsay et. all (2008) civil wars produce windows of opportunity for 
third parties that want to pursue national interests. Clearly, the Peruvian and 
Columbian civil war created such an opportunity, allowing the US to pursue an 
intense counter-insurgency and counter-drug war for the purpose of national security 
concerns. A careful consideration of the case studies tells us however, that national 
security was not the only item on Washington´s agenda. Many scholars assert that 
economic interest formed yet another important goal (Leech, 2001; Rochlin, 2010;  
Petras, 2001). I will shortly illustrate this. During the Cold War the National Security 
Doctrine was complemented by the Alliance for Progress, which familiarized the 
Andean countries with capitalism and American culture. According to Leech though, 
the Alliance for Progress merely acted as a safety valve for releasing growing social 
pressure while ensuring continued US hegemony in the region (Leech, 2002: 17). 
Colombia was also the first Latin American nation to initiate an Economic 
Development Plan, which held the US economy as a model (Leech, 2002: 17). At the 
same time, IMF and World Bank policies encouraged Peru and Colombia to open 
their economy and implement market-driven policies. As a result, Colombia´s average 
tariff decreased from 44 per cent in 1989 to less than 12 per cent in 1993 and its trade 
surplus was abruptly turned into a trade deficit (Leech, 2002: 48).  
Also post-Cold War US intervention had an economic motive. Plan Colombia has 
been analysed as representing the economic interest of the US government in a way 
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that it protects Latin America´s markets and resources to the benefit of US-based 
corporations (Petras, 2001). According to Leech, the training and equipment of 
Columbian military forces not only served the purpose of eradicating coca or combat 
the guerrillas, but was primarily aimed at diminishing rebel attacks on US oil and 
mining companies situated in Colombia (Leech, 2002: 64). Finally, the discourse on 
terror has provided an ideological justification for the militarization of the country 
that benefits chiefly transnational corporations (Rochlin, 2010: 735). US intervention 
in the Columbian conflict protects US access to Columbia´s extensive natural 
resources including oil, natural gas, coal, minerals and a relatively industrialized 
workforce (Leech, 2002: 66). A great part of the money is destined to assist military 
units to protect critical pieces of infrastructure and industry such as the Caño Limón 
pipeline in an attempt to protect the foreign investments of US corporations (Leech, 
2002: 84). Just how important the role of US corporations are in Plan Colombia is 
shown by the fact that the MPRI, a private military corporation, was awarded $4.3 
million by the American government to provide advice as to how to structure warfare 
in Colombia and help to device and formulate Plan Colombia itself. Other 
corporations that provided technology and advice were Lockheed Martin (radar 
systems), Sikorsky Aircraft and Bell Helicopter Textron (fighter helicopters) and 
Arinc (training, equipment and intelligence) (Rochlin, 2011: 727). 
 
In conclusion of the analysis of the first possible causal mechanism that could explain 
how foreign intervention prolongs the duration of civil war the following can be said. 
The principle goal of the Colombian and Peruvian government was to bring a halt to 
the expanding power of the Shining Path and the FARC. For the US however, 
counter-insurgency was not a goal in itself but one of the strategies to serve national 
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security and economic interests. I have shown that these diverging interests 
undermined the Peruvian and Colombian government´s ability to bring a peaceful 
conclusion to the conflict. We can thus conclude that US intervention, by introducing 
new interests, undermined the Peruvian and Colombian´s strategies and thus 
prolonged the civil war.  
 
6.2 The bargaining range 
The Peruvian and Colombian government´s strategies were undermined by yet 
another factor. On the one hand, US intervention significantly increased the military 
strength of the Peruvian and Colombian government, on the other hand a certain 
degree of autonomy was lost on their part, reducing their ability to deal with the 
insurgency independently. The militaristic nature of US intervention has let to an 
increasingly military responds on behalf of the Peruvian and Colombian government 
as well. US interventionist programs like the Andean Initiative and Plan Colombia left 
little room for the Peruvian and Colombian government to act on their own initiative. 
Following our second hypothesis we expected the following:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The bargaining range hypothesis 
Foreign support to a government in civil war reduces the bargaining range of the 
government in conflict and thereby prolongs the duration of the conflict. 
 
According to Cunningham, in negotiations among multiple parties with diverging 
interests, the set of agreements that all parties will accept is smaller (Cunningham, 
2006). The interests of the US have indeed been an obstacle to accomplishing a peace 
agreement on some occasions. In 2001 for example, after a series of meetings 
Barnhoorn 1311298 
	   51	  
between President Pastrana and FARC leader Manuel Marulanda, both sides reached 
an agreement to resume peace talks with discussions focusing on a prisoner exchange 
and a possible ceasefire. When inviting President George W. Bush to join in the talks, 
the US refused to join claiming that the FARC was using its demilitarized zone to 
rearm and increase its drug profits (Leech, 2002:82). Somewhat later government 
talks with the FARC hit upon another stumbling block (Leech, 2002:82). Following 
the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, Washington changed its 
rhetoric from emphasizing the FARC´s role in the drug trade to the guerrilla group´s 
place on the US State Department´s list of terrorist organizations, labelling the FARC 
as one of the most ¨dangerous international terrorist groups based on the hemisphere¨ 
and creating a $98 million counterterrorism package (Leech, 2002:82). As a result, 
Colombian militaries beefed up their forces around the perimeter of the demilitarized 
zone, which lead the FARC to walk away from the negotiating table demanding free 
access to the zone and ordering all US military advisors to leave Colombia (Leech, 
2002: 84). Washington responded by proposing a $98 million counterterrorism aid 
package and only weeks later the demilitarized zone was retaken by the Colombian 
military undoing everything that had been accomplished in the preceding months 
(Leech, 2002: 85).  
 
In Peru, the US did not directly pose a problem in negotiations due to the fact that the 
Peruvian government has always refused to conduct peace talks with the Shining 
Path. Indirectly thought, the US intervention did reduce the Peruvian government´s 
bargaining leverage by damaging its image and credibility. With US training, 
equipment and diplomatic backing the Peruvian militaries on counterdrug missions 
began to mount roadblocks, execute searches and seizures, force down suspicious 
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aircrafts, eradicate crops and in some cases arrest and interrogate civilians (Isacson, 
2005: 23). These activities were often accompanied by wide-spread human rights 
abuses, dead squads and massacres. US intervention played a role in the systematic 
erosion of the Peruvian government´s democraticness and left it highly unpopular and 
incapable of effectively tackling the Shining Path.  
 
The incidents mentioned above are meant to illustrate how the US action has 
hampered the Colombian and Peruvian government´s ability to deal with the FARC 
and Shining Path independently and effectively. What is crucial though is to assess 
the bigger picture, to see how US intervention structurally reduces the likelihood of a 
compromise in the long run. Again, the underlying reasons are related to US national 
security and economic interests. As a consequence of its national security concerns, 
the US strongly encouraged increased military expenditure and military involvement 
of the Peruvian and Colombian military during the ¨war on drugs¨. While US saw 
drug trafficking as a national security threat, the Andean countries merely perceived it 
as a law enforcement problem. Not surprisingly, the Colombian and Peruvian 
government were reluctant to increase the military´s role, especially at a time of 
tentative democratic reform (Isacson, 2005: 24). Nevertheless, Washington 
encouraged the Andean countries to militarize their counterdrug efforts by using 
heavy public diplomatic pressure (Isacson, 2005: 24). The demands to meet targets 
for the annual certification process and critical language appearing in official US 
reports encouraged countries to increase the military´s internal role in order to be seen 
as cooperating with the United States (Isacson, 2005: 24).  
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A lot of encouragement took also form in economic incentives. Again this hints at the 
US´s profound economic interests. The 1980s and 1990s were a period of economic 
transition in Peru and Colombia in which many neoliberal economic measures were 
swiftly implemented by economic elites (Avilés, 2008: 418). Past enthusiasm for 
liberal market economical strategies and IMF loans leave the current government no 
choice but to abide by the IMF´s stringent demands or face a political and economic 
backlash from multinational corporations and governments of developed countries, 
especially the United States (Leech, 2002: 46). The swift implementation of market 
liberation policies led to an accumulation of a crippling external debt. According to 
Rochlin, the manipulation of debt has been used by the US as the ultimate political 
tool and has caused considerable adjustment pain Peru and Colombia, leading to 
exacerbated social tension and stimulating subversion (Rochlin, 2003: 15). In the case 
of Colombia, the imposition of economic austerity programs as part of the US 
economic policy do not allow the government to give realistic consideration of the 
sort of economic and social restructuring demanded by the FARC (Leech, 2002: 84). 
Since the beginning of the conflict in 1964, there have been four serious negotiation 
attempts between the FARC and the Colombian government. It was only this year, in 
2013, that an agreement on land distribution was reached. Many other issues, like the 
future political integration of the FARC remain yet to be resolved however.  
 
The same is true for Peru, although to a lesser extent. Economic relations have 
improved significantly since the Shining Paths relative decline in the 1990s. 
Strengthened US-Peruvian cooperation with the Andean Trade Preference Act (1991), 
the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (2002) and the US-Peru Trade 
Promotion Agreement (2006) illustrate this. However, due to considerable leverage of 
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multinational companies and Peru´s expanding economic elite, the Peruvian 
government structurally fails to provide an answer to protests from the indigenous 
population and the poor who feel that their rights are insufficiently protected. If the 
Peruvian government continues to put the interest of multinational corporations above 
these concerns, then this dissatisfaction among the poor and indigenous could provide 
a source of support for a possibly re-emerging Shining Path and result in a surge in 
power similar to its initial rise in the 1980s (which was caused by similar sources of 
economic and social unrest).  
 
That US intervention, which is geared towards national security concerns and 
economic interest, has reduced the bargaining range of the Peruvian and Colombian 
government and hampered progress towards solving the conflict can be illustrated by 
various incidents. However, more important is to acknowledge that this has become a 
structural problem too. US national security concerns have forced the Peruvian and 
Colombian government to adopt an extremely militaristic approach to counter the 
Shining Path and the FARC and their drug related activities. US economic interests 
make it very difficult for the Peruvian and Colombian government to respond to the 
insurgency´s demands and are a source of social and economic unrest that feed rebel 
support. We thus find our second hypothesis supported as well.  
 
6.3 The informational approach 
Having discussed also the second hypothesis, I will now proceed to address the third 
hypothesis concerning the information asymmetry approach. This hypothesis is 
formulated as follows:  
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Hypothesis 3: The information asymmetry hypothesis 
Foreign support for a government in civil war distorts information asymmetries and 
thus prolongs the conflict.  
 
According to Cunningham (2006) foreign intervention distorts information 
asymmetries because it manipulates the perceived costs of war for both parties. I will 
discuss this notion with regard to the government side first and then proceed to 
discuss this with respect to the rebel side. On the government side, Regan claims that 
a government that finds itself supported by an external actor may overestimate its 
chance of winning (Regan, 2002). There are some signs that US support to Colombia 
lead to some overly optimistic thinking on behalf of the government. This has 
especially been the case in the years subsequent to Plan Colombia, which significantly 
weakened the FARC. According to Lee, the Defence Minister Juan Manuel Santos 
called the FARC a ¨paper tiger¨ (Lee, 2011:38). Although the FARC has agreed to 
release hostages and shows more willingness to cooperate in peace talks, such 
benevolent acts should not be equated with military incapacity (Rochlin, 2012: 739). 
A case in point is the bombing of a video store in a crowded area in Bogotá just prior 
to the release of six hostages in 2009 (Rochlin, 2012: 739). Information distortions do 
play a role in the Colombian and Peruvian conflict but there is not sufficient evidence 
that these are caused specifically by the US. If anything, for both Colombia and Peru 
holds that US intervention has most likely improved rather than distorted information 
about the insurgencies´ strength due to its assistance in intelligence and surveillance. 
By providing equipment and logistical support, the Peruvian and Colombian military 
have been able to effectively detect and subsequently attack guerrilla activity. In both 
countries US intelligence has played an essential role in capturing or killing key 
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figures of the FARC and the Shining Path. This strategy was especially important in 
capturing the Shining Paths´ charismatic and dictatorial leader, Abimael Guzmán in 
1992. Incredibly, the group´s power base went from maximum to zero virtually 
overnight (Rochlin, 2003: 3). According to Rochlin, the FARC has been less 
vulnerable to a strategy decapitation as was effective against the Shining Path. Its 
leaders are well-known, yet they have not cultivated a cult of leadership and its troops 
remain widely dispersed across the country. This makes US facilitated intelligence an 
even more important strategy to rely on (Rochlin, 2003: 258). Thus, regarding the 
government side, US intervention has reduced rather than exacerbated information 
asymmetries and has not prolonged but rather contributed to shortening the civil war. 
 
Considering information asymmetries caused by US intervention on the rebel side, we 
expected that intervention is interpreted as a sign of weakness and will lead to an 
overly optimistic calculated chance of winning and renewed motivation to continue to 
fight on behalf of the rebels (Cunningham, 2006). Although both the FARC and the 
Shining Path were heavily opposed to US support and may have interpreted this as a 
sign of weakness on the side of the Peruvian and Colombian government, there is no 
evidence that this increased their expectations of winning and lead to an increased 
level of force. Rather than viewing the presence of US intervention as a sign of 
weakness, in many cases rather the absence of US involvement was used as an 
opportunity to launch an attack. For example, during the Clinton administration US 
intervention in Peru and Colombia was relatively limited. It was during those years 
that the Colombian government ceded a territory as big as the size of Switzerland it in 
an effort to create a demilitarized zone and contribute to the peace process (Rochlin, 
2010: 31). Encouraged by this victory, the FARC took a tougher stand in peace talks 
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until the US stepped into the conflict, derailed the peace talks and retook the zone. In 
Peru, there are signs that the retreat of US equipped counterinsurgency bases and 
patrols in the past years has led to renewed Shining Path activity. In 2008 for 
example, the group launched its most violent attack in a decade, killing two civilians 
and thirteen soldiers (CRS, 2009: 8).  
 
We can thus conclude that the information asymmetry hypothesis finds itself not 
supported because there is insufficient evidence that US intervention caused 
information asymmetries, which distorted the actors chances´ of winning in such a 
way that it prolonged the conflict. Rather, US intelligence and surveillance have 
contributed to reducing information asymmetries, which in turn enabled the 
Colombian and Peruvian military effectively eliminate some of the key leading 
figures, and detect military bases and drug sites of the FARC and the Shining Path. 
Doing so, US intervention has contributed to shortening, rather then extending the 
duration of the conflict.  
 
6.4 The credible commitment approach 
Having discussed information asymmetries we will now move on to yet another 
commonly discussed phenomenon in the study of civil conflict. The fourth hypothesis 
is:  
 
Hypothesis 4: The credible commitment problem hypothesis 
Foreign support to a government in civil war amplifies the credible commitment 
problem and thus prolongs the conflict.  
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The credible commitment problem arises when a proposed agreement offers less than 
what the government or rebel side can gain by continuing to fight. In that case this 
party will not be able to credibly commit to an agreement because it foresees a future 
possibility to permanently alter the strategic balance (Powel, 2006; Blattman and 
Miguel, 2010). Based on the literature review, we know that the credible commitment 
problem hypothesis requires us to look at situations where 1) foreign intervention 
caused the state to default on an earlier promise because the balance of power had 
tilted in its favour, or 2) situations where rebels have defaulted because they could not 
commit to a promise made by a party that sees itself supported by an enemy that it 
deeply mistrusts.  
 
Considering the first situation, the problem that rises it that there have been only a 
few situations where a promise or agreement was made between the government and 
the guerrillas. One possible situation is the re-occupation of the demilitarized zone by 
Colombian forces in the late 1990s as a result of US support. In the Colombian and 
Peruvian case, the second situation is considerably more interesting to study. 
Generally, scholars do affirm that US intervention poses a serious obstacle to solving 
the civil conflict of Peru and Colombia because of the rebel´s deep distrust towards 
the US. The FARC for example, has always proclaimed that the US uses the issue of 
narco-trafficing as an excuse to increase its influence over Colombian internal 
policies and practices (Lee, 2011: 34). Also the Shining Path deeply mistrusts the US, 
denouncing is as the main agent of imperialism in Peru (Starn, 1995: 407). Many of 
the rebel´s attacks have been specifically aimed at US related targets. For example, 
the Occidental Petroleum´s Caño Limón pipeline was bombed over 1.000 times 
between 1990 and 2003 by the FARC. Of these attacks, 178 occurred in 2001, the 
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year in which US counterinsurgency was most intense (Rochlin, 2011: 737). In Peru, 
the Shining Path was involved in a car bomb explosion just outside the US embassy in 
Lima, right before a visit by US Preside George W. Bush in 2002. The explosion 
killed nine and injured thirty people.  
 
However, both rebel groups have undergone significant changes in terms of ideology 
in the past decade. They have downplayed their revolutionary roots and proclamations 
about the imperialist intentions of the US significantly. While US influence remains 
an important source of resentment, it is not the focal point of the rebel´s campaign. 
Rather than targeting the US directly, their anger is directed towards the Peruvian and 
Colombian government and the economic elite for their way of collaborating with the 
US and its associated institutions and corporations. This downplay of revolutionary 
rhetoric is principally caused by the fact that many of the older figures of the FARC 
and the Shining Path have died or have been captured. Their current recruits are 
relatively young and inexperienced and do not believe as strongly in the rebels´ 
ideology as the older members did. Most join for more selfish reasons such as 
notoriety and personal financial gain (Lee, 2011: 39). In Peru for example, many 
recruits join the Shining Path not for its Maoist ideology or anti-imperialist rhetoric 
but because it gives them access to the highly profitable drug industry. The 
commitment problem caused by US intervention has played bigger role in prolonging 
the conflict in the past than it does nowadays. Currently, the Peruvian and Colombian 
government seem to contribute especially to the credible commitment problem. We 
established that the credible commitment problem comes into place when a proposed 
agreement offers less than what the rebels can gain by continuing to fight. The 
institutional weakness, corruption and lack of attention to economic and social 
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inequalities on behalf of the Peruvian and Colombian government are important 
factors that induce the rebels to continue to fight rather than to lie down their arms. It 
is therefore that the fifth hypothesis is only partly supported because today, it is not 
the US, but the Peruvian and Colombian government that contribute to the credible 
commitment problem the most.  
 
6.5 The balance of power 
Before turning to the fifth hypothesis I will discuss the alternative hypothesis, which 
states:  
 
Hypothesis 6 (alternative): The balance of power hypothesis 
Foreign support for a government in civil war tilts the balance of power in favour of 
the government and should lead to a shorter civil war. 
 
Following the balance of power hypothesis, foreign support to a government in civil 
war should increase the government´s capabilities, increase its estimated chance of 
winning and tilt the balance of power in favour of the government leading to a shorter 
civil war. Two questions come to the surface. The first question that should be asked 
is: Did US intervention increase the Peruvian and Colombian government´s 
capabilities to combat the guerillas? The subsequent question is then: Did increasing 
the government´s capabilities translate into a shorter civil war?  
 
The earlier interventions of the US in Peru and Colombia up until the 1990s did not 
sufficiently increase the Peruvian and Colombian government´s capabilities to combat 
the rebels. During this time, the Shining Path and the FARC found room to increase 
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their military capacity and expand their territory. It was not until the 1990s that the 
US stepped up its game and US intervention became overwhelmingly geared towards 
combating the rebels. In Peru, this was a result of the increased cooperation between 
President Fujimori and the US administration on national security. In Colombia, US 
intervention hit a highpoint with the initiation of Plan Colombia.  
 
Concerning the first question, at this point of time US intervention did indeed increase 
the Peruvian and Colombian government´s capability to combat the rebels. According 
to Lee, the massive US military aid flowing into Columbia has dramatically increased 
the cost of the military struggle for the guerrillas (Lee, 2011: 30). Rochlin points out 
four ways in which the US has played a determinant role in weakening the FARC. 
First of all, by making effectively use of asymmetric combat tactics and training the 
Colombian army how to fight highly mobile guerrillas. Secondly, by surveillance and 
intelligence, which has made it easier to detect guerrilla and drug-trade activity. 
Thirdly, the US helped to weaken the communications system of the FARC. In Peru, 
it was due to the US intelligence service that the ultimate leader of the Shining Path 
could be captured. This leads us to our second question: Did this translate into a 
shorter civil war? 
 
On the one hand it did, because US intervention helped to reduce the power of the 
FARC and especially the Shining Path significantly. However, this did not necessarily 
end of the conflict. On the contrary, while combatting the rebels a lot of collateral 
damage was caused forming yet another obstacle towards bring the conflict to a 
peaceful end. In Peru, US foreign intervention has a mixed record since the military 
and financial support to the Peruvian military raised the level of violence against 
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civilians (Fielding, 2012). Additionally, the involvement of the US-Peruvian military 
in human right violations and massacres fueled anti-governmental emotions 
(Bejarano, 2013). In Colombia, the explicit focus of US intervention on the FARC 
gave other actors, especially the paramilitaries, the opportunity to increase their 
influence. Despite the current weakness of the FARC, up until today the government 
does control the entire Colombian territory. 
 
Thus, US intervention indeed increased the government´s capabilities and led to a 
significant reduction of the influence of the guerillas. However, this was 
accomplished at the cost of increased civil violence and surging power of other actors 
in the conflict and therefore did not directly translate into a shorter duration of the 
conflict.  
 
6.6 Military-financial intervention 
The results relating to the alternative hypothesis laid out above, have told us that US 
intervention was determinant in reducing the influence of the rebels, but that this was 
accomplished at a high cost. This makes us question whether the military approach 
adopted by the US was in fact the right method of intervention. I mentioned earlier 
that when analysing the causal mechanisms that link foreign intervention to civil war 
duration it is important also to consider the strategy of intervention. Therefore, I 
constructed the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 5: The military-financial intervention hypothesis 
Foreign military and financial support to a government in civil war breeds civil 
conflict in the target and thus prolongs the duration of civil war.  
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The literature review revealed that there is a significant amount of evidence that an 
overreliance on military means leads to a longer and more severe conflict in the long 
run. After careful examination of US intervention in Colombia and Peru I draw the 
conclusion that this is the case for the Colombian and Peruvian civil war as well. This 
result is based on three arguments.  
 
First of all, the extremely militaristic approach of the US led to a militarization of the 
overall conflict. Weapons and other military supplies that were meant for the police 
and the military felt into the hands of paramilitaries, drug traffickers, coca cultivators 
and most importantly the FARC and the Shining Path through trafficking and 
corruption. In Colombia, quite some paramilitary groups and FARC sections have 
formally surrendered; however, it has been extremely difficult to disarm and 
demobilize the recruits (Lee, 2011: 34). Often these recruits experience difficulties 
integrating into society, which results in them creating new armed groups. The 
militaristic nature of the US did not only fuel the guerrillas with arms, but also with 
support. The military character of the eradication, interdiction and fumigation 
campaigns has driven many farmers and civilians into the hands of the rebels, which 
allowed them to establish a stable support base (Lee, 2011: 34).  
 
Secondly, the militaristic approach of the US has led to an intensified level of 
violence overall. An empirical study conducted by Fielding has revealed that the 
militarization of Peru and the use of force by the Peruvian government encouraged the 
use of violence on behalf of the guerrillas, leading to a spiral of continuous violence. 
His study reveals that different types of aid affect the level of violence and combat 
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activity (Fielding, 2012: 851). The results show that military aid increases the 
government´s combat capacity. Subsequently, the positive coefficient of the 
insurgent´s use of violence equation, implies that the insurgent respond to this by 
increasing violence as well (Fielding, 2012: 860). Development aid however, has a 
different effect since the negative coefficient of development aid in the insurgent’s 
use of violence equation, suggests that aid increases the opportunity cost of insurgent 
recruitment, which limits their ability to use violence (Fielding, 2012: 860). In other 
words, a greater focus on development aid makes it more difficult and more costly for 
guerrillas to recruit and thus limits their capacity to use violence.  
 
Thirdly, by adopting an extreme militaristic approach the US is only treating the 
symptoms of the civil conflict and not the cause. According to Rochlin, an enormous 
strategic weakness of the US has been the lack concern regarding the forces that 
spawned dissent and civil warfare in the first place (Rochlin, 2003: 262). In the 
background section I identified weak governance, social economic unrest and drug 
trafficking as the most prominent problems. With regard to weak governance, the US 
approach has paid only little attention to strengthening the Peruvian and Colombian 
state institutions are contribute to making them more stable democracies. For Plan 
Columbia for example, more than 70 per cent of aid package was reserved for state 
security and counternarcotic operations while just about 8 per cent was invested into 
alternative development projects, 6 per cent to a human rights program, 4 per cent to 
the displaced, 2 per cent to judicial reform and less than 1 per cent to support the 
peace process (Leech, 2002: 67). Concerning Peru, the US has received a lot of 
criticism for neglecting to address the issue of human rights and democracy that hit a 
low point during Fujimori´s rule. Many analysts claim that the US´ decision to 
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disregard human rights violations and Fujimori´s authoritarian rule was a calculated 
decision. In other words, US officials were satisfied that the Peruvian authoritarian 
regime responded to US concerns and chose not to express their discontent over 
human rights abuse. Just as authoritarian leadership was often considered necessary 
by the US government during the Cold War given the appeal of communism, it was 
now considered necessary given the appeal of the drug trade and the reversal of free 
market reform (Vallas, 2003: 159). Despite durable US involvement, Colombia 
remains a state with one of the highest rates of political killings and forced 
disappearances. The government structurally fails to protect its politicians and 
civilians from assassinations and kidnappings, leaving the political arena paralyzed 
and inaccessible. In light of the current progression with the peace talks, a political 
solution for the FARC becomes a possible reality. The UP experiment in 1985 was a 
disastrous first attempt. Almost twenty years have past but it remains questionable 
though if Colombia is ready for another trial.  
 
Concerning social economic unrest, the US military approach undermined the 
problems of Colombia´s and Peru´s rural population. According to Schulz, US 
funding that is currently spent on fumigation and eradication is better spent on viable 
crop substitution programs combined with infrastructural development to help 
peasants change to the production of legal crops that is truly profit generating (Schulz, 
1999: 226). Even if the government were to achieve a complete military victory over 
the FARC, that victory would have to be coupled with a political agreement that deals 
with poverty, insufficient employment and educational opportunities and economic 
equality. Fortunately, in the past decade the US has downscaled its military assistance 
in Peru and instead significantly increased funds that go to development, crop 
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substitution programs and judiciary reform The current allocation of aid is a 
significant improvement compared to the 1980s and 1990s seeing a substantial 
increase in funds for alternative development programs. In 2008 for example, Peru 
and the US signed a $35.6 million Millennium Challenge Threshold program to 
support Peru´s efforts to reduce corruption in public administration, implemented by 
USAID (CRS, 2009: 7).  
 
These policies have proven to be quite successful in solving the third problem, drug 
trafficking. In Peru, counternarcotic policies seem to have been successful in 
eliminating the relationship between the narcotraffickers and the guerrillas. UNODC 
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) reports show that between 1992 and 
2002 coca production fell by 63% (UNODC, 2003). In the past decade coca 
production has stabilized but slightly increased by approximately 2% annually 
(UNODC, 2010). In 2012 though, Peru took over Colombia as the world´s largest 
coca producer. This is inevitably related to a rapid fall of coca production (15% 
between 2001 and 2009) in Colombia (UNODC, 2010). Experts warn for a 
¨comeback¨ of coca production in Peru due to successful eradication efforts in 
Colombia and a rapid increase in demand from Europe. This increase has been 
characterized by re-appearances of the Shining Path. So far, the US approach has been 
quite successful in putting a temporary halt to coca production in the Andean. 
However, to avoid a re-emergence of coca production and related guerilla activity in 
the near future, also other strategies, including regional cooperation and a greater 
focus on demand restricting policies in the West, should be adopted. 
 
Thus, financial and military support to the Peruvian and Colombian government led to 
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an intensification of the civil conflict because it increased the access and the use of 
arms by all actors involved in the conflict. By neglecting the importance of 
complementary development and social-economic policies US, strategy failed to 
tackle the structural problems that provide the base for guerrilla support and which are 
essential for terminating the civil conflict.  
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7. Conclusion 
In this study we have moved beyond the assumption that civil war is a two-party 
process and acknowledged the need to investigate the role the role of foreign 
intervention, which has become a salient phenomenon in the past decades. The 
following question has been addressed: How can foreign support to a government in 
civil war prolong the duration of the conflict? Whereas previous studies in the 
scholarly field of foreign intervention and civil war have provided evidence for a 
causal relationship between foreign intervention and prolonged civil war duration, this 
study aimed to unravel the causal mechanisms that lead foreign intervention to 
prolong the duration of civil wars by looking at US intervention in the Colombian and 
Peruvian civil conflict. In this last chapter I will first review the evidence in the light 
of the articulated hypotheses and then discuss some of the implications in terms of 
theoretical development and policy formation.  
 
The hypotheses 
Acknowledging the independent nature of foreign intervention, we found support for 
the first hypothesis. Diverging interests and policy goals between the Andean 
governments and the US lead to diverging strategies. The dominance of the 
militaristic approach has limited the bargaining range of the Peruvian and Colombian 
government on various occasions and will probably continue to do so in the future. 
Thus, we see our second hypothesis supported as well. The third hypothesis looked 
for possible information asymmetries caused by intervention but was refuted because 
evidence showed that US intelligence and surveillance contributed to shortening 
rather than extending the conflict. Regarding the fourth hypothesis, which addressed 
the credible commitment problem, we concluded that US intervention may have 
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contributed to this problem in the past, but current evidence points at the Peruvian and 
Colombian government as the actors that pose the biggest obstacle for the Shining 
Path and the FARC to credibly commit to a peace agreement. The case studies 
provided insufficient support for the informational approach and the credible 
commitment theory. The fifth and sixth hypothesis addressed the strategy of US 
intervention. Regarding the sixth hypothesis we found that the US military-financial 
approach did indeed limit the power of the insurgents but that this did not directly 
translate into a shorter duration of the civil war overall. Next to this, by treating only 
the symptoms of the civil conflict, and not its cause, US intervention contributed to 
prolonging the duration of the conflict. This means that we can accept the fifth 
hypothesis and refute the sixth and alternative hypothesis.  
 
Having analysed the hypotheses we can conclude that the following causal 
mechanisms contributed to US intervention prolonging the duration of the Peruvian 
and Colombian civil war in the following way. While the principle goal of the 
Peruvian and Colombian government is to fight the insurgents, for the US, counter-
insurgency is not a goal in itself but merely a strategy to serve national security 
concerns and economic interests. The military-financial intervention that was adopted 
to serve this purpose has limited the Peruvian and Colombian government´s ability to 
deal with the insurgents independently and effectively. Next to this, US intervention 
has militarized the conflict and encouraged the deployment of violence by all actors 
involved in the conflict. Finally, while the US may have debilitated the FARC and the 
Shining Path militarily, by disregarding the root causes for the existence of these 
rebels in the first place, it has failed to terminate the conflict as a whole.  
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Theory development 
The implications for theory development in the field of foreign intervention and civil 
war are as follows. Having examined the first two hypotheses I conclude that the role 
of foreign intervention must be assessed relative to the motives of interveners. Also, 
one must consider how and in what way this intervention changes the relationship 
between the government and the insurgent (Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, 
2008: 5). The case-study method has proven to be a valuable method to examine these 
aspects and I therefore encourage to further this method in this field. Interestingly, 
while the informational and credible commitment approach are two of the most 
respectable theories in studies that have focussed on the causal effect between foreign 
intervention and civil war duration, in this study, which examined the causal 
mechanisms, we found relatively little evidence. Additionally, while previous studies 
focussed primarily on formal military intervention, the results of the last two 
hypotheses of this study insinuate that more attention should be devoted to studying a 
larger variety of strategies and their perceived effect on civil war duration. 
 
Policy formation 
Moving to the implications for policy formation I believe that two important lessons 
can be drawn. First of all, policy makers should be conscious of the risks of 
introducing foreign actors into a civil conflict since foreign actors are likely to have 
potentially separate interests to conflicts than domestic actors do, which makes it 
more difficult to terminate the conflict (Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, 2008: 
20). Secondly, the notion of what constitutes an effective intervention strategy is an 
important element in understanding how civil conflicts are managed  (Regan, 2002: 
72). When focusing exclusively on military and financial forms of outside 
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interventions, the symptoms of the conflict may be cured but not its cause. A military 
approach encourages governments to focus on internal enemies but distracts them 
from stabilizing and empowering their political and justice systems (Isacson, 2005: 
52). Past interventions can be criticized due to their apparent blind spot regarding the 
importance of the cultivation of social consent, which in the end is the basis for 
political stability and durable peace (Rochlin, 2011: 740). Hopefully, current 
interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali and Syria will take a different course but at 
the moment the picture seems rather bleak.  
 
In this line, I am in favour of limiting the number of bilateral interventions and 
encouraging as much as possible interventions of a multilateral character. In the case 
of multilateral interventions, there is less chance that the interests of one intervening 
party comes to dominate the interests of the supported government. Next to this, 
multilateral interventions tend to adopt more varied strategies, that is if the true 
intentions of intervention are truly to solve the conflict. As the Colombian and 
Peruvian case have shown, if the objective of an intervention is simply crush an 
insurgent to serve only national security or economic concerns, then an outside 
military intervention is an effective strategy to do so. However, if the objective of an 
intervention is to truly terminate a civil conflict and establish durable peace, then a 
solemnly military intervention is probably one of the most devastating strategies that 
one can adopt.  
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